Ferguson trial was widely seen as a "charade." I argue that the Ferguson spectacle was the inevitable denouement of the Godinez decision. I then look at the Ferguson trial (through contemporaneous press and television coverage) under the filters of "sanism" and "pretextuality." I conclude that the "dignity" value-a prerequisite for a constitutionally-acceptable fair trial-was, as a result of Godinez, lacking in the Ferguson case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The public and the media rarely show interest in Supreme Court decisions in mental disability law cases. Both are intensely interested in cases involving famous litigants in which mental disability is an issue Gohn Hinckley being the most celebrated case, and Susan Smith serving as a more recent example) or in which an individual mentally disabled person's case is seen as somehow emblematic of a flawed social policy (the sagas of Larry Hogue, and before that, Billie Boggs, known also as Joyce Brown, on the Upper West Side of New York City being two provocative examples). 1 If the Supreme Court were to decide, for instance, that involuntary civil commitment was unconstitutional (which it will never do) or that / the use of the insanity defense was unconstitutional (which it can never do), such stories might conceivably be the lead articles on the front page of the New York Times or the Washington Post. But other cases generally pass with little attention, unless (as in the zoning cases of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 2 or the more-recent City of Edmonds v. Oxford House 3 ) there are wide implications beyond the narrower world of mental disability law.
And so it was when the Supreme Court decided Godinez v. Moran in the spring of 1993. 4 The Supreme Court has, for over a decade, been fascinated with the interplay between mental disability and the criminal trial process. 5 It has issued a lengthy series of decisions dealing with such issues as the privilege against self--incrimination, the interplay between competency and the death penalty, the right of ~ insanity defendant to refuse the imposition of antipsychotic medications during trial, the application of the right to refuse treatment to convicted prisoners, the constitutionality of state laws allowing for the continued retention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill, the constitutionality of state laws allowing (or the retention of insanity acquittees for longer periods of time than the maximum to which they could have been sentenced had they been convicted of the underlying . charges, the allocation of the burden of proof in a competency to stand trial proceeding, and more. 6 Few drew much attention (except perhaps for those involving insanity acquittees, and there the attention was primarily collateral to the facts of the Hinckley case). And Godinez was another in this series.
In Godinez, the Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas and over an impassioned dissent by Justice Blackmun, held that the standard for determining a defendant's competency to plead guilty or to waive counsel was the same as the standard employed to determine his competency to stand trial. 7 The decision reversed a Ninth Circuit finding that the former inquiries were to be more searching and that they obligated the trial judge to determine whether the defendant had the capacity for "reasoned choice" among the alternatives offered to him, a capacity that would require "a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial. " 8 A unitary competency finding in criminal cases was all that was constitutionally required, the Supreme Court ruled, concluding that there was "no basis for demanding a higher level of competence" for defendants who chose to plead guilty or waive counsel.
At the time, Godinez was seen as yet another Supreme Court criminal procedure victory for prosecutors, and as a means of insuring both more convictions and fewer appellate reversals of convictions. If all that was required was a finding that the defendant could meet the incompetency to stand trial test of Dusky v. United States (that the defendant had a "rational understanding of the proceedings"), 10 then it would be likely that more mentally ill-but-legally-competent defendants would plead guilty and would waive counsel. In both instances, more convictionsconvictions now nearly impervious (on these grounds, at least) on appeal-would flow.
Godinez has inspired surprisingly little critical commentary. A few student notes critiqued it (though-others praised it); a piece by forensic psychiatrist Alan Felthous carefully analyzed it, and found it wanting. 11 Yet, compared to the outpouring of commentary that followed the decisions in Riggins v. Nevada ( on the right of the insanity pleader to refuse medication at trial) 12 or Foucha v. Louisiana (on the constitutionality of statutes allowing the continued retention of no-longer-mentallyill insanity acquittees), 13 the decision virtually passed without notice. 14 This, in retrospect, should probably not have been surprising. The public's obsession with the use of the insanity defense is probably matched by its profound disinterest in the role of incompetency in the criminal trial process. 15 There are reasons for this: although incompetency is raised in far more cases than is the insanity defense, courts rarely find defendants to be incompetent. 16 When they do, prosecution is usually simply deferred (with the defendant in pretrial custody) until the defendant regains his competency to stand trial; 17 if it is unlikely that the defendant will regain his competency in the "foreseeable future" (a category reserved for the most seriously mentally impaired), it is most likely that he will be committed to a secure forensic hospital for a lengthy stay (in many cases, a lifetime commitment). 18 In such cases, defendants may very well simply "fade away" from public consciousness. Defendants in this category rarely are the "type" of defendants who commit the highly-publicized acts that have generated Oct. 18, 1993 , at 25 (majority decision in Godinez "appears to be contrary to much professional opinion, both legal and medical, and to prevailing trends in the law") . 12 See articles cited in 2 PERuN, supra note 7, §5.65A, at 99-100 n.1088.60 (1995 Supp.). 13 See articles cited in 3 id., §15.25A, at 207-09 n.479.46 (1995 Supp.). 14 A search of the NEXIS/CURNWS database in LEXIS revealed not a single contemporaneous newspaper editorial commenting on the decision. The only law review commentary has been the articles cited supra note 11. 15 controversy over the insanity debate. 19 In short, the public has never been terribly interested in this area of the law, an apathy usually shared by the press and other media.
The arrest and trial of Colin Ferguson, however, focused national attention on this question. Even without the issues that are central to this article, Ferguson's case had all the high cards of a media circus: a mass murder on a New York City commuter train by a black defendant who sought out white victims as his targets. 20 When the level of Ferguson's mental illness became clear, the picture was complete. And public attention was intensified when Ferguson-relying (implicitly, at least) on Godinez-chose to represent himself at his trial, and chose specifically to disavow an insanity defense (based on a purported "black rage" theory) proposed by his lawyers, the high-profile William Kunstler and an associate. 21 The spectacle of a highly intelligent but seriously mentally ill defendant opening to the jury, doing direct and cross examination, and entering evidentiary objections, struck onlookers as yet another argument for the widely-held view (endorsed by many) that the American judicial system was flawed beyond repair. 22 And yet, public attitudes toward the Ferguson trial were dramatically different from those toward other mentally ill defendants. In other cases, insanity pleaders were seen as shamming, malingering, pulling the wool over.the courts' eyes, and so on. 23 Here, the fact that Ferguson was allowed to represent himself-and his failure to enter an insanity plea-was seen as a charade, a travesty of justice, or a sham. 24 In other such cases, lawyers are regularly pilloried for their "sleazy'' tactics in promoting mental state defenses (and once-in-a-lifetime cases such as the alleged use of the "twinkie" defense in the Dan White case are discussed as if the use of such a plea is common); 25 here, the lack of counsel-even a counsel so regularly vilified by the public as Kunstler-was seen as, for want of a better phrase, utterly crazy. 26 In short, Ferguson's use of Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Godinez (in one of the many ironies of this case, Ferguson has .likened himself to Justice Thomas, as another victim of a "high-tech lynching") 27 caused the public to reverse--almost completely-many of the "sanist" attitudes that -are regularly invoked in "famous" cases involving mentally disabled crimin;ll defendants.
Why is this? And what are its implications for the development of mental disability law, for the criminal trial process in general, for the ways that competence 19 In Part II, I discuss the Godinez case and place it in the context of earlier incompetency to stand trial case law. In Part ill, I discuss the Ferguson case, in the context of Godinez, and consider how some of the "hidden factors" in Godinez may be illuminated by the denouement of the Ferguson trial. In Part IV, I consider the public attitudes toward the Ferguson trial, and try to "read" those attitudes in the contexts of what we know about both sanism and pretextuality. I conclude that the conduct of the Ferguson trial was inevitable after the Godinez decision, and that, in the end, the criminal trial process was seriously robbed of its needed dignity.
II. THE GODINEZ CASE 29

A. Introduction
Professors James Ellis and Ruth Luckasson have appropriately characterized the issue of assessing the competence of guilty pleas entered by mentally disabled defendants as presenting "one of the most difficult doctrinal and practical problems faced by the criminal justice system," a difficulty reflected in the "sharply divided" case law that has developed in this area. 30 Before Godinez, courts traditionally had generally recognized that the standard for competence to plead guilty is generally higher than for other sorts of consent or waiver.3 1 However, courts had split on the significant question of whether the standard to plead guilty is the same as, higher than, or otherwise different from, the traditional standard for assessing competence to stand trial; for example, whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. " 32
The majority view had held that there is no substantial difference, and that the same test applies in assessing the validity of a guilty plea. were merely conclusionary and bereft of any sort of doctrinal analysis. Only in People v. Heral did a court offer substantive justifications for the unitary standard: that a finding of competency to stand trial necessarily involved a finding that a defendant was capable of waiving his constitutional rights, and a dual standard might create ''a class of semi-competent defendants who are not protected from prosecution because they have been found competent to stand trial, but who are denied the leniency of the plea bargaining process because they are not competent to plead guilty. " 34 This position was challenged, however, by a series of cases involving both mentally i11 35 and mentally retarded 36 defendants. These cases suggested a separate test: "A defendant is not competent to plead guilty if a mental [disability] has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the consequences of his plea. " 37 Such a test has been employed by those courts that find it necessary for judges to "assess a defendant's competency with specific reference to the gravity of the decisions with which the defendant is faced," 38 a test applauded by Ellis and Luckasson. 39 The rationale for this more stringent standard was that a simple finding of trial competency was not a sufficient basis for finding that the defendant was able to "make [other] decisions of very serious import. " 40 On the question of waiver of counsel, a significant amount of case law had also developed over the question of the level of competency required for a defendant to waive representation by counsel. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta v. California, 41 holding that a defendant has a federal constitutional right to represent himself if he voluntarily elects to do so, courts have focused on the question of whether a defendant has "the mental capacity to waive the right to counsel with a realization of the probable risks and consequences of his action. " 42 To meet such a standard, it is not necessary that the defendant be technically competent to represent himself but only that he be "free of mental disorder which would so impair his free will that his decision to waive counsel would not be voluntary." 43 To this end, neither bizarre statements and actions, 44 mere eccentric behavior, 45 nor a finding that the defendant had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic 46 have been found in specific cases to be enough to establish lack of capacity to represent oneself. On the other hand, waiver of counsel should be "carefully scrutinized," 47 and the record must reflect that "the accused was offered counsel and knowingly and intelligently refused the offer. " 48 The court is required to conduct "more than a routine inquiry when making that determination. " 49 Thus, at least several courts have found than the standard for self-representation is a higher one than the standard for competency to stand trial, 50 since "literacy and a basic understanding over and above the competence to stand . trial may be required." 51 A New Jersey intermediate appellate court has thus considered the full range of peninent issues:
Without the guiding hand of counsel, a defendant may lose his freedom because he does not how to establish his innocence .... Trained counsel is also necessary to vindicate fundamental rights that receive protection from rules of procedure and exclusionary principles .... Where the doctrine supporting these rights "has any complexities the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself." . . .
These considerations militate strongly in favor of exercising . great caution in determining whether a proposed waiver of counsel satisfies constitutional standards. Within the context of the potential pitfalls of self-representation, it has been said "the court must make cenain by direct inquiry on the record that defendant is aware of 'the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included with them, the range of allowable punishments there under, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.' " 52
B. Godinez
The Supreme Court ended both of these controversies in Godinez, where it held that the standards for pleading guilty and for waiving counsel were no higher than for st anding trial: Did the defendant have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding" and a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"? 53
The facts of the Godinez case are straight-forward. The defendant Moran shot a hanender and a patron, and subsequently stole the bar's cash register. Nine days l~ter, he went to his former wife's apartment, and shot her five times. He then shot hunself in the abdomen and attempted (unsuccessfully) to slit his own wrists. All three of his victims died; Moran confessed to police from his hospital bed two days after the shooting of his wife. 54 pair of psychiatrists who found him competent to stand trial. Some 2 1/2 months after these evaluations were done, Moran appeared before the court, seeking to discharge his attorneys and plead guilty, explaining that he wanted to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing. 55 The court accepted his guilty plea and his waiver of counsel, finding that he could "intelligently and knowingly" waive his right to assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas had been "freely and voluntarily" given. He was subsequently sentenced to death by a three-judge court on each of the three murders. 56 Subsequently, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Moran's sentence for the tavern murders, but reversed the sentence for his wife's murder, and remanded the case for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole. 57 Next, Moran filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state trial court; the court rejected his claim that he was "mentally incompetent to represent himself." 58 His appeal was dismissed by the state Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 59 Moran then filed a federal habeas petition. It was denied by the District Court, but the District Court's denial was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial record should have led the trial court to "entertain a good faith doubt about [Moran's] competency to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver," and that waiver of constitutional rights required a "higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial," a level it characterized as "the capacity for 'reasoned choice.' " 60 In coming to its decision, the appellate court stressed the defendant's suicide attempt, his desire to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence to the court at his sentencing hearing, his "monosyllabic" responses to the trial court's questions, and the fact that he was on four different prescription drugs at the time he sought to change his plea and discharge counsel. 61 The Supreme Court reversed, per Justice Thomas, rejecting the notion that competence to plead guilty or waive counsel must be measured by a higher ( or even different) standard from that used in incompetency to stand trial cases. 62 It reasoned that a defendant who was found competent to stand trial would have to make a variety of decisions requiring choices: whether to testify, whether to seek a jury trial, whether to cross-examine his accusers, and, in some cases, whether to raise an affirmative defense. While the decision to plead guilty is a "profound one, ... it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. " 63 It concluded on this point: Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. 65 · Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred. They noted their concern with those aspects of the opinion that compared the decisions made by a defendant who pleads guilty with those made by one who goes to trial, and they expressed their "serious doubts" that there would be a heightened competency standard under the Due Process clause if these decisions were not equivalent. 66 Justice Blackmun dissented (for himself and Justice Stevens), focusing squarely on what he saw as the likely potential that Moran's decision to plead guilty was the product of "medication and mental illness. " 67 He reviewed the expert testimony as to the defendant's state of depression, a colloquy between the defendant and the trial judge in which the court was informed that the defendant was being given medication, the trial judge's failure to inquire further and discover the psychoactive Properties of the drugs in question, the defendant's subsequent testimony as to the "numbing" state of the drugs, and the "mechanical character" and "ambiguity" of the defendant's answers to the court's questions at the plea stage. 68 On the question of the multiple meanings of competency, Justice Blackmun added:
[T]he majority cannot isolate the term "competent" and apply it in a vacuum, divorced from its specific context. A person who is "competent" to pJay basketball is not thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life or the law. 
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Godinez is a powerful document that speaks simultaneously to the empirical realities of the criminal trial process, the impact of mental illness and medication on a defendant's capacity for reasoned choice, and, perhaps most importantly, the role of pretextuality in the incompetency to stand trial process. 71 He rejects the formulistic approach of Justice Thomas's majority opinion, weighs the pertinent social science evidence, and demonstrates how the trial record reflects the "ambiguity" of the controlling colloquy between counsel and the trial judge. The underlying tensions of the case are exacerbated even further because the defendant had been sentenced to death. The Supreme Court has considered the relationship between mental illness and the competency to· be executed, 72 the relationship between mental retardation and the competency to be executed, 73 and more recently has declined to consider on the merits the constitutionality of medicating a defendant so as to make him competent to be executed. 74 The decision in Godinez-virtually guara~teeing less searching inquiries in cases involving defendants of questionable competencywill likely complicate even further this area of mental disability law jurisprudence. 75 The Court's decision is particularly troubling and perplexing, given its opinion the prior year in Riggins. In Riggins, the Court found that the involuntary drugging of an insanity-pleading defendant at trial potentially violated that defendant's fair trial rights. 76 The Court also found that, because involuntary medication could impair a defendant's ability to ''follow the proceedings," "the substance of his communication," and "the content of his testimony," 77 such drugging would be proscribed unless the state could demonstrate medical appropriateness and that, considering less intrusive alternatives or means, that it was "essential for the sake of [defendant's] own safety or the safety of others" or so as to obtain an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Moran was receiving such drugs and, as Justice Blackmun underscores in his dissent, the court's perfunctory questions "only augment[ed) the manifold causes for concern by suggesting that his waivers and his assent to the charges against him were not rendered in a truly voluntary and intelligent fashion. " 79 Inexplicably, the majority in Godinez does not even cite Riggins.
Riggins is even more important because of its chronology in the court's refusalof-medication jurisprudence. It came soon after the court had decided in Washington v. Harper8° that an informal administrative procedure was sufficient to satisfy the refusal of medication rights of a convicted prisoner. 81 
had not yet been convicted at the moment that he entered his plea and discharged his counsel. The Godinez opinion is utterly bereft of any analysis of this issue.
In its other major holding, the Godinez court found that there was "no reason" to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an "appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. " 83 It rejected the defendant's arguments that a self-representing defendant must have "greater powers of comprehension, judgment and reason, than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney," concluding th~t this rested on a "flawed Premise; the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." 84 Relying on its decision in Faretta, 8 5 the Court found that a defendant's ability to represent himself "has no bearing upon his competence to choose selfrepresentation. ' ' 86 Justice Blackmun's dissented on this point as well, concluding:
A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial establishes only that he is capable of aiding his attorney in making the critical decisions required at trial or in plea negotiations. The reliability or even relevance of such a finding vanishes when its basic premise-that counsel will be present-ceases to exist. The question is no longer whether the defendant can proceed with an attorney but whether he can proceed alone and uncounselled. The manner in which Ferguson conducted his defense was described aptly by a Boston Globe commentator as providing "uniquely creepy television," and, quoting Court TV president Steven Brill, the ultimate triumph of "form over substance. " 99 ~ong the defense strategies used by Ferguson included the announcement that he would call as a witness a parapsychologist and exorcist who would testify that government agents had planted a microchip in Ferguson's head and that he (Ferguson) had been "lasered out by a remote-control device." 100 Also, during his cross-examination of the ballistics expert, Ferguson asked whether the bullet fragments had been tested for "alcohol or substance abuse." 101 In his summation-characterized uniformly as "rambling and sometimes incoherent"-he argued that the 19 shooting survivors had conspired with police authorities to convict him. 102 Finally, in his allocution statement at sentencing, he told the court: Jeffrey Dahmer's death in prison was not coincidence. It was timed just moments before I was given pro se status in anticipation of my trial beginning in a matter where it was setting the precedent for my murder in an upstate prison. 103 Ferguson was convicted on six counts of murder and 22 counts of attempted murder, weapons possession, and reckless endangerment, and acquitted on 25 counts of civil-rights violations. 104 He was sentenced to over 300 years in prison. 105 The observation that Ferguson's courtroom behavior ranged from the "bizarre to the surreal" 106 was never contradicted. Godinez's dictates. As Robin Topping-one of a small handful of trial observer/ reporters who understood the link between Godinez and the Ferguson trialpointed out in Newsday:
B. Ferguson and Godinez
It's not a simple situation for the judge. ITudge) Belfi has to perform a delicate balancing act. He is legally obligated to take extra precautions to make sure that Ferguson is given a fair trial-especially because he is not a lawyer. He must be careful that Ferguson doesn't disrupt the trial but he has to be equally careful in revoking his right to represent himselflest he, Belfi, be reversed by a higher court. 107 Ferguson is yet another in a lengthy series of pre-Godinez and post-Godinez cases concluding that "bizarre behavior" is not necessarily evidence of incompetency. 108 Godinez purports to balance fair trial and autonomy issues, concluding that "a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing on his competence to choose self-representation." 109 On the other hand, it warns that the wa~ver of counsel must be "intelligent and voluntary" before it can be accepted. 110 · To what extent was this standard complied with in the Ferguson trial? Godinef sp(,!aks only to questions of decisional competency: if the defendant has the capacity to decide to waive counsel, then the standard for determining his competence to stand trial will suffice. It ignores-fatally, in my view-the other question that is needed to give life to an otherwise sterile and formalistic legal doctrine: Does the defendant have the functional ability to represent himself? 111 This is the question addressed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, and studiously ignored by Justice Thomas in the majority. It is here that Godinez fails and the reason for the Ferguson "charade" becomes apparent: the key question-Did Colin Ferguson, truly, have the capacity to conduct his own defense in a meaningful way, to conduct it 'with dignity?-remains unasked. 11 . 2 " 1 Felthous, supra note 11, at 105; Taub, supra note 11, at 28, 29. Godinez is an example of the Supreme Court's willful blindness at its worst. The court is aware-it must be aware-of the pretextual way that incompetency to stand trial proceedings are frequently conducted. 113 The court is aware--it must be aware--of the way that incompetent defendants are "shuttled':.' back and forth between jail and mental hospital, reflecting frequent changes in their trial competency status. 114 The court is aware--it has stated that it is aware--of the potential impact of drug side effects on mentally disabled criminal defendants and the integrity of the trial process. 115 And yet, in Godinez it blithely brushes all these empirical realities aside and endorses a minimalistic test that is sure to further sap the integrity of the criminal trial process.
Was Colin Ferguson functionally competent to conduct his own defense? 116 Some guidance here may be found in McKaskle v. Wiggins. 117 There, the Supreme Court listed some ,.of the tasks a pro se defendant must be allowed to perform without interference from "standby counsel": to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points oflaw, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court where appropriate. us It defies credulity to suggest that Colin Ferguson was able to do these tasks in such a way that insured a trial that reflected the type of "solemnity" and "dignity" that are integral to a trial's fairness.
IV. SANISM, PRETEXTS, THE PUBLIC AND COLIN FERGUSON
A. Sanism 119 '.'Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same q~ality and character of other Irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 120 jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 121 Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural presuppositions that engulf us all," 122 they express discomfort with social science 123 (or any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society) and skepticism about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism allows them to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective OCS, both of which perpetuate the myths and stereotypes of sanism. 124 Sanism is readily detected in court processes in mental disability law cases. Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 125 Judical language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled individuals 126 and contempt for the mental health professions. 127 Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist myth is that "[m]entally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint". 128 Sanist thinking allows judges to avoid difficult choices in mental disability law cases. Their reliance on non-reflective, self-referential alleged "ordinary common sense" contributes further to the pretextuality that underlies much of this area of law.
B. Pretextuality
The entire relationship between the legal process and mentally disabled litigants is often pretextual. By this I mean simply that courts accept (either implicitly. or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, shqw a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." 129 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans Participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, Perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and other Public defender/legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the mentally disabled persons involved in the litigation in question.
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders. 130 Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential concepts of ,, morality" 131 and openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria that impose rigorous be~avioral standards as predicates for commitment 132 standards as prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial finding. 133 Often this testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect in their testimony.
This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently-sanist fact-finders. 134 Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously, frequently rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decisionmaking, thus subordinating statutory and caselaw standards as well as the legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the process. 135 
C. The Ferguson Trial
Was the Ferguson trial pretextual? Was it a "sham, a charade ... ", or was it the vindication of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to self-representation? In one of the most unscriptable ironies of the entire affair, Ferguson likened himself to Clarence Thomas, claiming they had both been victims of "high tech legal lynchings." 136 One wonders how Ferguson would have responded had he known that Thomas authored the Godinez opinion that set the wheels of justice in motion in his own case. The Court's holding in Godinez reflected at its base the court's profound disinterest in (and perhaps, cynicism about) the integrity of the criminal trial process. Its opinion must be read against the background of both its decision in Strickland v. Washington, 131 and the reality that counsel generally made available to mentally disabled persons is substandard (and especially substandard in the case of mentally disabled criminal defendants). 138 Was the Ferguson trial sanist? This is an exceedingly difficult question to answer. At first glance, it appears that Godinez was the rarest of all creatures: a nonsanist opinion that captured the votes of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas, the core of the Court that has consistently taken the most sanist positions in their opinions. 139 Godinez-specifically-appears to grant significant autonomy to mentally disabled criminal defendants, to treat them more like other defendants, to neither infantilize nor demonize them, 140 and to decline to focus solely on their mental disability in construing their criminal process trial rights.
That this, however, may be little more than a trompe d'oeil illusion begins to become apparent as one contextualizes the public reaction to the Ferguson trial. First, Ferguson's initial set of lawyers fell all over themselves in an effort to make Ferguson appear as mentally disabled as possible: "A delusional psychotic," declared Ronald Kuby, Kunstler's associate; 141 a "raving maniac," chimed in Kunstler; 142 a "deranged man with a crazy defense," again from Kuby. 143 Colin Moore, a black activist attorney who had represented Ferguson on another matter, called the trial a "ritualistic sacrifice." 144 And a prominent columnist characterized Ferguson as "nutty as peanut brittle. " 145 The irony was noted by a Washington Post commentator:
The Fergiison trial has the lawyer-hating masses clamoring for-you guessed ita real lawyer. Suddenly, lawyers are agents of rationality and justice." 146
Other lawyers raised the question of fundamental fairness in other ways. Said Jack Litman, "As horrific as the crimes are, when people see someone battling for himself and he doesn't know how to do it, they feel this isn't fair. " 147 Leon Friedman honed in on what he saw as Judge Belfi's failure to inquire into Ferguson's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive counsel. 148 Professor Burt Neuborne focused on the community's need for an "imprimatur of guilt": "It was important for everyone to ~a_y 'You did something terrible,' and they want to be sure Ferguson never gets out of Jail. It served an important social purpose. But that is not the purpose of a trial. " 149 And while the trial had its "moments of catharsis for survivors," it left a "nasty, hollow feeling in its wake." 150 Jan Hoffman's analysis for the New York Times rings the most true: Judge Belfi's ruling addressed a broader social need as well. Since 1981, when John Hinckley shot President Reagan, the public has grown weary and fearful of both the insanity defense and a defendant's being found continually unfit to st and trial. People are concerned that such defendants will somehow unjustly elude conviction and punishment, and that terrible crimes will never be brought to closure.1s1
By the time the trial was over, some observers shifted their original perspective on Ferguson. Said the widow of one victim who originally assumed Ferguson was insane ("because I couldn't believe any human being could actually do this"), "There is no doubt now that he is sane; . . . a very calculating, manipulating person." 152 The Ferguson trial, in summary, concluded with the same sort of stereotypical constructions of mentally disabled criminal defendants as have most of the other important cases to draw media attention since the trial of John W. Hinckley.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to discuss the Ferguson trial-"one of the most bizarre cases in court history" 153 -without invoking Hamlet: Is Justice Thomas hoisted by his own petard? Godinez rejected the argument that an assessment of competence for counsel-waiver purposes need be more searching or detailed than one for ability-to-stand-trial purposes. This rejection resulted, ultimately, in the affirmance of the defendant Moran's conviction in that case, 154 a "victory" for the state of Nevada (where Moran's crimes were committed) and the United States Department ofJustice (that shared argument on the Supreme Court level with the state). 155 It is beyond argument that one of the hoped-for results of a prosecutorial victory would be an increase in the number of convictions (and a concomitant decrease in the number of appellate reversals) in cases involving defendants of questionable competence. 156 And the denouement of Colin Ferguson's case was precisely such a result. Richard Moran's original guilty plea attracted no national attention. The Supreme Court's decision in Godinez attracted little. The Ferguson case was a media circus. The heuristic of the vivid case 157 quickly educated the media and the American public about the broad outlines of the Godinez rationale (although few of the thousands of press stories about Ferguson made the explicit link between that case and the Godinez decision). For better or worse, just as the Hinckley case drove the insanity "reform" debate of the early 1980's, 158 159 Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry into an irony that seems never to have been considered in the literature: the parallels between the post-Hinckley insanity defense "reform" debate (on whether the affective/behavioral prong of the insanity defense should be jettisoned, leaving only a cognitive prong, see id. at 17-27) and the inquiry posed here (as to whether a cognitive inquiry is sufficient in a competencewaiver case, or whether a functional standard must be met as well).
Godinez is, at base, a cynical and meretricious decision. It is cynical because of its sole focus on the cognitive aspects of the capacity determination and its profound disinterest in the functional aspects. It is meretricious because it appears to simplify and unify a complex area of the law; in reality, it simply makes it more likely-far more likely-that more seriously mentally disabled criminal defendants will be convicted and subsequently imprisoned. 160 It is also meretricious because, though it appears to privilege autonomy in an almost libertarian. way, it actually exposes the majority's deep contempt for mentally disabled criminal defendants and its utter disinterest in the logical and likely results of the decision. 161 And this contempt extends to a contempt to the victims of crimes such as those committed by Ferguson.162 Reaction to the Ferguson trial exposes the pretextuality that provides. ·the underpinning of the Godinez decision. Although public and media response did not appear to be as overtly sanist as, say, typical responses to mitigating mental disability evidence in death penalty cases 163 or federal judges' construction of such evidence in their application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 164 the trial spectacle remained profoundly sanist. 165 The appearance of justice is a component of a fair trial; 166 that appearance was sadly lacking in Ferguson's trial.
Godinez, to be blunt, is a bad decision. It is also a cruel decision. Few onlookers can quarrel with the ultimate verdict in the Ferguson case, but the steps along the way did nothing more than strain justice and mock the Constitutional guarantees of a fair trial. Dignity, indeed, was the first to leave. 160 S .
161
ee id. at 428-29 (offering similar argument against abolition of the insanity defense). Fe Profoun~ therapeutic jurisprudence questions are also raised by both the (1995) . b See Johns, supra note 162 ("Regrettably, Thomas' opinion does not fit reality or serve justice. It's a ackward step in the face of a mushrooming population of mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and ~entally retarded people ensnared in the criminal justice system"). ·
